| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab EE affecting all versions from 19.5 before 19.5.6 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to start a Duo Workflow session with elevated privileges beyond those declared by the foundational flow due to improper enforcement of privilege boundaries in certain client environments. |
| GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab EE affecting all versions from 19.1 before 19.3.9, 19.4 before 19.4.8, and 19.5 before 19.5.6 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user with developer-role permissions to bypass admin-configured AI tool governance controls in a governed namespace due to improper binding of authorization tokens to their intended workflow execution context. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha.2 before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability in DELETE /admin/api/faq/delete that lets language-scoped FAQ_DELETE admins bypass their language scope. Attackers can submit a faqId with an in-scope faqLanguage lacking a translation to wipe shared ACL, tags, votes, comments, and attachments of other translations. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha.2 before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an improper authorization vulnerability in updateUserRights that lets USER_EDIT admins drop category restrictions on group rights. Attackers can re-save rights through the user update-rights API to convert category-restricted group rights into global direct rights, then edit, publish or delete FAQs in withheld categories. |
| An incorrect authorization vulnerability in the SNMP parameter of Zyxel EE5301-00 customized firmware version 5.63(ACLD.2)b3_D0 could allow an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) condition on an affected device. |
| phpMyFAQ 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows authenticated frontend users to receive restricted FAQ titles by subscribing to Web Push notifications. When editors publish user/group-restricted FAQs, WebPushService::sendToAll() delivers the question, FAQ id, category, and slugified URL to every subscriber, bypassing the FAQ ACL. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha.2 before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability that allows category- or language-restricted editors to bypass scoped rights via public REST write endpoints. Attackers with a scoped right and the shared API token can use PUT faq/update, POST faq/create, and POST category to rewrite published FAQs and create root categories outside their scope. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.12 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability that allows delegated group or user admins to remove rights they do not hold by submitting empty rights lists. Attackers can send an empty rightIds or userRights array to group/permissions or user/update-rights to wipe all rights of more-privileged groups or administrators. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha.2 before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability that lets scoped editors view out-of-scope draft FAQs because the dashboard and admin search ignore category/language-scoped FAQ_EDIT rights. Authenticated editors can load the unpublished FAQs widget with the lang parameter or query /admin/api/faq/search to leak draft titles, ids, and confirm words in draft bodies. |
| phpMyFAQ through 4.1.12 and from 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the admin FAQ copy and translate pages, which check only global FAQ_ADD or FAQ_TRANSLATE rights. Authenticated add-only or category-scoped editors can open any FAQ to read drafts, ACL-restricted records, private notes, and author e-mail addresses. |
| A repository registered by its owner as a source of scoped workflows kept that registration when it was transferred to another owner. The new owner could then change the workflows in the transferred repository, and they kept running in the previous owner's repositories with access to their Actions secrets and job tokens. A transfer now removes the owner-level registrations of the repository, and registrations whose source repository no longer belongs to the registering owner are ignored. |
| In Eclipse BaSyx Go Components versions up to and including 1.1.2, ABAC-enabled deployments of the Submodel Repository and the AAS Environment do not apply an access rule's `FILTERLIST` fragment filters to single Submodel reads.
`GET /submodels` removes the fields that a rule's `FILTERLIST` hides, but `GET /submodels/{submodelIdentifier}` and `GET /submodels/{submodelIdentifier}/$metadata` return them unfiltered. An authenticated caller with READ access to a Submodel can therefore read fields that the access rules hide from them, for example `supplementalSemanticIds` keys that name the other parties allowed to read the Submodel.
If versioning is enabled (`history.mode` set to `api` or `audit`), `GET /submodels/{submodelIdentifier}/$history` and `GET /shells/{aasIdentifier}/$history` in the Submodel Repository, AAS Repository and AAS Environment return the complete stored version without applying the rule's formula or fragment filters. A caller whose rules grant READ on these routes can read fields that the access rules hide, and Submodels and Asset Administration Shells that the direct read does not return to them at all.
The issue is fixed in Eclipse BaSyx Go Components v1.1.3. |
| In Eclipse BaSyx Go Components versions up to and including 1.1.2, ABAC-enabled deployments of the Submodel Repository and the AAS Environment return Submodel Elements that the caller is not authorized to read from `GET /submodels/{submodelIdentifier}/submodel-elements`.
If an access rule grants READ on a single Submodel Element through a `$sme` `REFERABLE` object, the list route returns every element of that Submodel, including its value, as soon as one element matches the caller's rules. The single-element route and the full Submodel read enforce the same rule and deny access to the other elements. An authenticated caller with a READ grant for one element of a Submodel can therefore read all other elements of that Submodel.
The issue is fixed in Eclipse BaSyx Go Components v1.1.3. |
| The AGit flow (pushing to `refs/for/...`) did not check the pusher's access to pull requests again when it created the pull request. A user or deploy key with read access to the code only, or with write access to the wiki over SSH, could open pull requests in a repository where they have no access to pull requests. Creating a pull request through AGit now requires read access to the pull requests of the repository and is refused for wiki pushes. |
| Removing a team's review request looked up a review by the negated team ID, which for the team with ID 2 is the ID of the built-in Actions user, and marked the review it found as official. In the organization that owns that team, a user who can change the review requests of a pull request could make an approval left by the Actions user count toward the approvals required by branch protection. Merging still required permission to merge. Removing a team review request no longer changes any review. |
| The web endpoint that removes an attachment skipped the permission check when the request came from the user who had uploaded the attachment, and it was reachable with read access to issues or pull requests. A user who had uploaded a release asset could still delete it after losing write access to the repository. The endpoint now only deletes attachments that the user uploaded and that are not yet linked to an issue, comment or release. |
| When a file is edited in a fork through the web editor, Gitea can first copy a branch from the base repository into the fork. That copy did not check whether the user may read the base repository's code. A user who had forked a repository and later lost access to it, for example after it was made private or they were removed as a collaborator, could keep copying its current branches into their fork and read them. The copy now requires read access to the code of the base repository. |
| Git over HTTP lowers the required permission for pushes to read access, so that the AGit flow works, and relies on the repository's server-side hooks to enforce write access. A repository that is still being created by a migration, fork or template generation has no hooks yet, so a user with read access to it could push branches and tags during that window, or after a failed migration that left the repository in that state. Git over HTTP now refuses requests to repositories that are still being created. |
| Several endpoints that work on both issues and pull requests did not check which of the two the addressed item is. A user who can read a repository's issues but not its pull requests could read pull request data through the issue sub-resources of the API (timeline, attachments, labels, subscriptions, tracked times and reactions), and list pull requests through the repository's issue search and milestone pages; the same applied in the other direction. These endpoints now check read access to the unit the item belongs to. The API endpoints were fixed in 28.2.0 and 28.3.0, the search and milestone pages in 28.4.0. |
| Wiki.js is an open source wiki app built on Node.js. Prior to 2.5.315, an authenticated account with only manage:users can use users.update to change the password of any local account, including the Root administrator and other accounts with manage:system, by omitting the optional groups argument, which is automatically allowed and bypasses destination-group authorization without checking the target's current privileges. The attacker can use users.disableTFA to clear the same target's tfaIsActive state and TFA secret without a target-privilege check, then authenticate with the replacement password. Supplying groups: [] to users.update can remove every group relationship from a selected administrator and leave the installation without a legitimate account holding manage:system. Additional administrators with IDs greater than 2 can also be deactivated or deleted. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.315. |