| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In Eclipse Ditto versions 2.4.0 to 3.9.8, Thing fields a requester is not allowed to read can be disclosed through the `condition` and `live-channel-condition` headers, which are evaluated against the
full Thing: the READ check of `live-channel-condition` is skipped when a `condition` header is also present on Thing query commands (3.0.0 to 3.9.8); both headers are evaluated without any authorization
on WoT Thing Description requests (`Accept: application/td+json`) when WoT TD permission filtering is not active (by default in 3.0.0 to 3.8.14, in 2.4.x with WoT integration enabled, and in 3.9.x with
filtering disabled); the `condition` of live messages and live events is evaluated without a READ check, and of claim messages without any permission (3.1.0 to 3.9.8); and the twin response of a Thing
query with a non-matching `live-channel-condition` is returned without filtering it by the policy (3.0.0 to 3.9.8). This allows an authenticated user to read Thing fields they are not allowed to read, in
some cases without any permission on the Thing. |
| In Eclipse Ditto versions 3.9.0 to 3.9.8, the resolved policy view (`GET /api/2/policies/{policyId}?policy-view=resolved`) does not restrict merged policy content to what the caller may read in the policy it originates from. Imported and namespace-root entries are returned in full as soon as the caller may read any part of them in the source policy, entries of transitive imports and of the imports of namespace-root policies are only checked against the intermediate policy, and content copied into an entry by `references`, also from another entry of the same policy, is not checked against the referenced entry. An authenticated caller with READ on a policy can therefore read subjects, resources and granted/revoked permissions of policy entries that are hidden from them, including by explicit revokes, when reading the originating policy directly. |
| In Eclipse Ditto versions 2.0.0 to 3.8.14 and 3.9.0 to 3.9.8, the authorization check for JSON merge patch commands on Things (HTTP `PATCH` / Ditto Protocol `merge`) does not check permissions for fields
deleted or set to an empty object by the patch: fields with a `null` value or an empty object value (`{}`) are skipped by the check, and Ditto's regex-based key deletion with the documented `{{
~<regex>~ }}` syntax is not recognized as a deletion. An authenticated user with WRITE permission on any part of a Thing can therefore delete other attributes, features and the definition of that Thing,
or overwrite or create fields as empty objects, including parts the policy revokes or never grants WRITE on.
--> |
| In Eclipse Ditto versions before 3.8.15 and 3.9.0 to 3.9.8, the policy enforcers do not let a revoke win over a grant in two kinds of permission checks. Checks of several permissions at once compare the highest grant weight with the highest revoke weight across all requested permissions instead of per permission, so the "check permissions" API (`POST /api/2/checkPermissions`, available since 3.7.0) can report a set of permissions as granted although one of them is revoked. Partial permission checks, which authorize retrieving Things and Policies and determine the receivers of events, count a grant on a sub-resource although the same permission is revoked on that sub-resource for another subject of the same authorization context (or, with the memory-optimized policy evaluator, for the same subject). A requester can thereby learn about the existence of Things and Policies and receive metadata without any readable content, and an application relying on the check permissions result may grant access the policy denies. The content of retrieved Things and Policies is still filtered correctly, and modifications are not affected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't repair fs summary counters with garbage
LOLLM noticed that if we scan the filesystem and come up with totally
garbage numbers for the summary counters, we don't actually mark the
scan incomplete. Because we don't do this, repair can install the
garbage values into the filesystem, making things worse. Don't do that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't proceed with xattr repair if the live update fails
LOLLM observes that we ought to make one last check for failed live
updates before replacing the xattr structure. Let's be cautious here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't fix the directory tree if live update fails
LOLLM complains that we don't double-check dl->aborted one last time to
before committing repairs to the filesystem. This is important because
the live update handler could have set ->aborted if it encountered a
runtime error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: always reset incore attr fork buffer when resetting fork
LOLLM noticed that the local format attr fork verifier depends on
if_bytes being set correctly. However, the fork reset function doesn't
reset that correctly, which can cause post-repair verifier failures.
Fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: actually lock the metafile reservation when adjusting after repair
LOLLM reported that xrep_reset_metafile_resv performs unlocked loads
and stores to the metadata file space reservation counters and thus can
race with other threads. Fix this by taking the lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: avoid cross-rtgroup reaping after a repair
LOLLM notices that the extents stored in a xrtb_bitmap (aka xfs_rtblock
bitmap) can span multiple rtgroups due to two circumstances. The first
is that the size of an rtgroup is an exact power of two, which means
that rtgroups are adjacent in the segmented xfs_rtblock_t address space.
This is fairly common to reduce the amount of multiplication and
division needed to handle space on the rt volume.
The second is that (unlike in the original rtgroups design), rtgroups do
not have fixed-location metadata like AGs do, which means that there's
nothing to force a break between rtgroups.
Therefore, we must loop through the rtgroups in xreap_rtmeta_extent to
avoid running off the end of an rtgroup while reaping. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: require DELETE access for delete-on-close opens
smb2_open() accepts FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE on an existing file without
DELETE in DesiredAccess. When the request asks only for
FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES or READ_CONTROL, it also skips inode_permission()
and the parent directory MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC check that delete-on-close
is meant to get. The file is then marked for deletion by a caller who
could not delete it.
The unlink happens later, in __ksmbd_inode_close(), when the last handle
on the inode is closed, and it runs with the credentials of that handle.
If the caller closes last, the unlink fails. If another user who can
write the parent directory, such as the file's owner, still has the file
open, the file is deleted when that user closes it. Until then new opens
of the file fail with STATUS_DELETE_PENDING. So a user with only search
permission on a directory can delete a file in it, or block opens of it,
while the owner has it open.
A MAXIMUM_ALLOWED open that also requests DELETE has the same problem.
The requested access is replaced with the maximal access, which does not
include DELETE when the caller cannot write the parent directory, and the
later permission checks are skipped as already done.
MS-FSA 2.1.5.1 requires an open with FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE and without
DELETE in DesiredAccess to fail with STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER, and Samba
does the same. Add that check to the CreateOptions validation, using
the generic-mapped DesiredAccess so that GENERIC_ALL still qualifies.
This also refuses MAXIMUM_ALLOWED with FILE_DELETE_ON_CLOSE but no
explicit DELETE, as MS-FSA and Samba do. When MAXIMUM_ALLOWED is
requested with DELETE but the maximal access does not include DELETE,
fail with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. With DELETE requested, delete-on-close
opens go through the existing parent directory check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()
The issue:
This is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric.
After vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call
bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh().
__bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking
only that mac_header < network_header. Nothing verifies that the MAC
header is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the
redirect goes on to read is linear either.
A SCHED_ACT BPF program can do:
bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0);
bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0);
after vlan pop_eth. The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of
linear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb->len < skb->data_len BUG in
__skb_pull():
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839!
RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50
Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -> packet_xmit -> packet_sendmsg
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
The v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC
header is gone. On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0
after the pull, so the network header sits at skb->tail and the route
lookup reads ip4h->protocol, ip4h->saddr and ip4h->daddr past the linear
area.
The Fix:
Use skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of
skb->mac_len. mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit
packets, while the span still rejects the one-byte header produced by
pop_eth + bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0). The single check also covers
the mac_header >= network_header test it replaces.
Use pskb_may_pull() to make the Ethernet header linear before it is read
or pulled, and to make the IP header linear in both the v4 and the v6
path before ip_hdr()/ipv6_hdr() is read. The header pointers are taken
after the pull, since pskb_may_pull() may reallocate skb->head.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
On x86-64 with 4 KiB pages, enable CONFIG_PACKET, CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL,
CONFIG_NET_SCH_INGRESS, CONFIG_NET_CLS_MATCHALL, CONFIG_NET_ACT_VLAN and
CONFIG_NET_ACT_BPF. Run as root with BPF loading, network administration
and raw-packet privileges. Bring lo up and attach a SCHED_ACT program
that calls bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0), then returns
bpf_redirect_neigh(skb->ifindex, NULL, 0, 0):
ip link set lo up
tc qdisc add dev lo clsact
tc filter add dev lo egress matchall action vlan pop_eth pipe \
action bpf object-file neigh_chghead.o section action
Send an untagged ETH_P_IP frame of ETH_HLEN + 8192 bytes through an
AF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW socket bound to lo, without PACKET_VNET_HDR or
PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS. Use a unicast destination MAC. The sender's skb
has a 14-byte linear Ethernet prefix and a fragmented payload; pop_eth
removes that prefix and change_head restores only one linear byte.
The unfixed neighbor redirect then tries to pull 14 bytes and BUGs.
Sending the same frame without pop_eth and change_head leaves the IP
header in the frags, which is the route lookup reading past skb->tail. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/loongson: Handle buffer mapping failures when clearing a BO
lsdc_bo_clear() ignores the return value from lsdc_bo_kmap() and writes
to lbo->kptr unconditionally. When the first mapping of a newly allocated
buffer fails, kptr is still NULL and the subsequent memset accesses it.
Return the mapping error without touching the buffer and propagate it
from lsdc_gem_object_create(). Install the GEM object functions before
clearing so that drm_gem_object_put() can release the buffer correctly
on failure. Do not add the failed object to the tracking list or return
an uncleared buffer to the caller.
Imported buffers still skip clearing, and successfully mapped buffers
are cleared and unmapped as before.
Tested on LS7A2000 with a one-shot range error in ttm_bo_kmap(). Its
-EINVAL return reached userspace, the object was destroyed once, and
no GEM handle was published. Normal create/map/zero/write/read/close
cycles passed, with the tracked BO count and VRAM usage unchanged.
AI assistance was used for the lifetime analysis, fix, fault-injection
tools, build and test execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: Verify the iSCSI ISID is null-terminated
iscsi_parse_pr_out_transport_id() returns the ISID of a FORMAT CODE 01b
TransportID as a pointer into the PERSISTENT RESERVE OUT parameter list,
lowercased in place and never null-terminated. spc4r37 Table 508 requires
the field to be null-terminated, but a non-conforming initiator can omit
the NULL; when the ISID ends at the end of the received buffer, the pointer
is not a C string.
The registration code still consumes it as one: strcmp() in
__core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg() and in the REGISTER AND MOVE path, and
snprintf("%s") in __core_scsi3_do_alloc_registration(), which also reads
its first 8 bytes unconditionally with get_unaligned_be64() - a NUL check
does not bound that read.
When the parameter list spans more than one page, transport_kmap_data_sg()
maps it with vmap(), and the over-read walks off the end of the mapping
into the vmalloc() guard page and oopses. Reproduced with a PR OUT
REGISTER + SPEC_I_PT parameter list of exactly 8192 bytes whose final
TransportID carries a 12-byte ISID without a terminating NUL:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc9000138c000
RIP: 0010:strcmp+0xc/0x30
Call Trace:
__core_scsi3_locate_pr_reg+0xd3/0x120 [target_core_mod]
core_scsi3_decode_spec_i_port+0x8fc/0x13a0 [target_core_mod]
core_scsi3_emulate_pro_register+0x73c/0x900 [target_core_mod]
...
iscsi_target_rx_thread+0xef/0x1d0 [iscsi_target_mod]
With a single-page parameter list the buffer is a kmap() direct mapping, so
the over-read continues into the physically adjacent page instead of
faulting. snprintf("%s") then copies whatever follows the ISID in memory
into pr_reg_isid, and PR IN READ FULL STATUS reports the registration back
to any initiator, turning the over-read into an info leak of kernel heap
contents. Reproduced with a 4096-byte parameter list whose last
TransportID ends at the end of the buffer with a 4-byte ISID and no NUL,
interleaved with I/O to populate adjacent pages: the READ FULL STATUS
response returned the ISID as "0xleak" followed by raw bytes that were not
part of the parameter list. The snprintf() into
pr_reg_isid[PR_REG_ISID_LEN] caps the echoed ISID at 15 characters, so at
most 11 bytes past the buffer are leaked per command, but the PR OUT
command is not rate limited.
Any initiator that can send PR OUT to an iSCSI-exported LUN can trigger
either variant, including a guest via vhost-scsi.
Require 8 bytes to remain after the ",i,0x" separator, and a NUL inside the
rest of the descriptor, before the ISID pointer is returned. REGISTER AND
MOVE fails with TCM_INVALID_PARAMETER_LIST; on SPEC_I_PT no target port
claims the malformed TransportID, and the command fails the same way. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: prevent deleting the wrong subvolume by ID
When deleting a subvolume by ID, btrfs_ioctl_snap_destroy() first
resolves the requested ID to a name, then looks up that name again
under the parent directory lock.
A concurrent rename can change which subvolume is associated with
the name between these operations. Since the deletion path does not
verify the ID of the resolved subvolume, it can delete a different
subvolume while leaving the requested one intact.
This was reproduced by repeatedly exchanging the names of two
subvolumes using renameat2(RENAME_EXCHANGE) while deleting one of
them by ID. The wrong subvolume was deleted in 9 out of 14 independent
tests.
Fix this by checking that the resolved subvolume ID matches the
requested ID while holding the parent directory lock. Return -EAGAIN
on a mismatch so that userspace can retry the operation instead of
being told that the requested subvolume does not exist. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause()
sctp_init_cause() accepts a chunk when skb_tailroom() can hold the
cause header and the payload. sctp_addto_chunk() then writes 0-3
bytes of padding before that header so the chunk stays 4-byte
aligned. The check does not include the padding, and the following
skb_put() calls skb_over_panic() from softirq.
Count the padding sctp_addto_chunk() is about to write. The cause
length on the wire stays the header plus the payload.
Found by LLM inspection, triggered and tested the fix. |
| Mongoose Embedded Web Server / Networking Library before 7.24 contains a WebSocket fragmentation validation vulnerability that allows remote attackers to spoof message metadata by sending a single CONTINUATION frame with FIN=1 as the first data frame instead of a required TEXT/BINARY start frame, violating RFC 6455 sequencing rules. Attackers can craft this malformed frame to make mg_ws_cb() in src/ws.c misinterpret the first byte of payload as saved FIN/opcode flags, causing the application to receive a dispatched MG_EV_WS_MSG event with attacker-controlled flags and data truncated by one byte without closing the connection. |
| The BuddyBoss Addons plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Account Takeover in versions up to, and including, 1.2.1. This is due to the Social Login REST endpoint trusting unverified Apple and Facebook identity-token claims and linking an attacker-controlled provider identifier to an existing WordPress user selected by the token’s email claim. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who know a user’s email address to associate their provider identity with that account, including administrator accounts, and subsequently authenticate as the victim. Successful exploitation requires the BuddyBoss Platform plugin to be installed and active, with the Social Login module and selected provider enabled and configured. On sites with the separate BuddyBoss App JWT component, the vulnerable REST request can return an application token immediately. |
| Dell PowerStore SDNAS contains an authentication-bypass-by-replay vulnerability in the NAS NDMP service that could allow a network attacker to gain backup and restore control of the appliance. |
| A vulnerability in the phishcheck functionality of ClamAV could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a DoS condition on an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to improper allocation of memory during processing of URLs. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a URL to be processed by the software. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the ClamAV scanning process to terminate, resulting in a DoS condition on the affected software. |