| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha.2 before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an authorization bypass that lets category- or language-restricted editors rewrite visibility ACLs and tags of any FAQ. Attackers send faq/update requests with a target faqId and an untranslated lang to expose restricted FAQs, wipe tags, or overwrite orphaned FAQs. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.12 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read editor-only Private Notes by querying the public FAQ list API. Attackers can page through GET /api/v4.0/faqs or /api/v3.1/faqs without credentials to retrieve the notes field of every anonymously readable FAQ, exposing internal remarks and ticket details. |
| phpMyFAQ 4.1.9 before 4.1.12 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an account enumeration vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to identify valid logins through differing POST /api/webauthn/prepare responses. Attackers can submit wordlists of usernames, reusing one unconsumed CSRF token without rate limiting, to discover administrator logins for password spraying and phishing. |
| phpMyFAQ 3.2.5 before 4.1.12 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the user/request-removal API endpoint that lets authenticated users file account removal requests as other users. The ownership check calls getUserById() with the attacker-supplied userId on the session user object, so it compares the input against the target's own record. Attackers who know a victim's login name and email can submit that userId, loginname, and email, sending administrators a spoofed Remove User Request email. This may lead an admin to delete the victim's account and data. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha.2 before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows language-scoped editors to read other translations by checking FAQ_EDIT against the route language but loading the ?lang= UI-language row. Attackers can request the admin.faq.edit route with an authorized language and a different lang parameter to read drafts, private notes, author e-mails and revisions. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha.2 before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability in POST /admin/api/faq/import that lets FAQ_ADD users bypass the FAQ_PUBLISH right. Authenticated contributors can upload a CSV with column 8 set to true to publish unreviewed, optionally sticky FAQs such as phishing content. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the multisite Redis configuration store that is not tenant-scoped. As a result, tenant administrators can read and overwrite the master instance's effective configuration. Attackers can save configuration through /admin/api/configuration, optionally resetting storage.redisPrefix, to redirect master SMTP, set a known API token, or alter authentication settings. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability that allows FAQ_EDIT users to bypass SvgSanitizer using namespace-prefixed elements like <x:script>. Attackers can upload malicious SVGs through the admin image upload so script runs in the site origin on IIS, hijacking sessions of users like super-admins. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha.2 before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability in DELETE /admin/api/faq/delete that lets language-scoped FAQ_DELETE admins bypass their language scope. Attackers can submit a faqId with an in-scope faqLanguage lacking a translation to wipe shared ACL, tags, votes, comments, and attachments of other translations. |
| phpMyFAQ from 4.2.0-alpha.2 before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an improper authorization vulnerability in updateUserRights that lets USER_EDIT admins drop category restrictions on group rights. Attackers can re-save rights through the user update-rights API to convert category-restricted group rights into global direct rights, then edit, publish or delete FAQs in withheld categories. |
| phpMyFAQ 4.1.0 before 4.1.12 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability in POST /api/webauthn/prepare that creates accounts as active, bypassing manual activation and domain whitelisting. Anonymous attackers can obtain the freely issued CSRF token and register an activated account with an unverified email to access registered-user-only content and functions. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.12 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in its public FAQ REST API that exposes author names and e-mail addresses to unauthenticated callers. Attackers can query the faq and paginated faqs endpoints to bulk-harvest e-mails and de-anonymise users who opted out of GDPR author visibility. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.12 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-RC.2 contains an information disclosure vulnerability that allows authenticated low-privilege users to read unpublished FAQ titles via bookmark_action. Attackers can request FAQ detail pages with bookmark_action=add across sequential ids, then view /user/bookmarks to reveal draft and pending submission question text. |
| phpMyFAQ 4.1.9 before 4.1.11 and 4.2.0 pre-releases before 4.2.0-beta.3 contain an account enumeration vulnerability in the unauthenticated POST /api/webauthn/prepare-login endpoint, which returns stable stored credential IDs for passkey-registered accounts but an md5(time())-derived fallback ID otherwise. Unauthenticated attackers can compare allowCredentials IDs from requests sent more than one second apart, without rate limiting, to identify existing passkey-registered accounts and their credential IDs. |
| phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, an unauthenticated attacker can submit a guest FAQ with an email address that is syntactically valid per RFC 5321 (quoted local part) yet contains raw HTML — for example "<script>alert(1)</script>"@evil.com. PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL accepts this email as valid. The email is stored in the database without HTML sanitization and later rendered in the admin FAQ editor template using Twig's |raw filter, which bypasses auto-escaping entirely. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.10 contains an object-level authorization bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to modify or delete any visitor question by supplying an arbitrary openQuestionID to POST /api/faq/create. Attackers solving the CAPTCHA can rewrite question categories, forge answered entries in faqquestion_history, or permanently delete questions when records.enableDeleteQuestion is enabled. |
| phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, there is a stored XSS vulnerability via Regex Bypass in Filter::removeAttributes(). This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in attachment.php that allows attackers to download attachments of restricted FAQs by bypassing per-record permission checks. Low-privileged users with the dlattachment right, or anonymous users when allowDownloadsForGuests is enabled, can request attachment IDs to retrieve confidential files from restricted FAQs. |
| phpMyFAQ 3.2.0 before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in GET /admin/api/user/data/{userId}, which returns any user's full faquserdata row, including the live TOTP secret, without a SuperAdmin or protected-target check. Delegated administrators with user-management rights can read a SuperAdmin's TOTP secret and generate valid codes to bypass two-factor authentication. |
| phpMyFAQ before 4.1.9 and 4.2.0-alpha before 4.2.0-beta contains an improper authorization vulnerability in attachment.php that fails to verify whether an attachment's parent FAQ is published or visible to the requester. Authenticated users with the dlattachment permission can request index.php?action=attachment&id=<ID> to download complete attachment files belonging to draft FAQs. |